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Researches on the risk of expropriation that have been carried out by researchers have no 
consistency in the results because of differences in the characteristics of companies in each 
country. This study aims to empirically examine the effect of share ownership structure on 
transactions that allow the risk of expropriation of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) over the period of 2010-2014. This research was done by downloading a 
summary of the financial statements of non-financial companies. Selected samples of 61 non-
financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange 2010-2014. Data were analyzed by 
quantitative approach, i.e. by multiple linear regression using SPSS 21. Simultaneous test 
results indicated that the structure of share ownership affects the risk of expropriation. 
Partially, institutional ownership and public ownership had a negative effect on the risk of 
expropriation and individual ownership had a positive effect on the risk of expropriation. The 
risk of expropriation carried out by controlling shareholders towards non-controlling 
shareholders is smaller when ownership of shares by institutions and the public can act as a 
party that monitors management's performance as a company manager. 
 





Penelitian tentang risiko pengambilalihan yang telah dilakukan oleh peneliti tidak memiliki 
konsistensi dalam hasil karena perbedaan karakteristik perusahaan di masing-masing negara. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji secara empiris pengaruh struktur kepemilikan saham 
pada transaksi yang memungkinkan risiko pengambilalihan perusahaan yang terdaftar di 
Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama periode 2010-2014. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan 
mengunduh ringkasan laporan keuangan perusahaan non-keuangan. Sampel yang dipilih dari 
61 perusahaan non-keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek 2010-2014. Data dianalisis dengan 
pendekatan kuantitatif, yaitu dengan regresi linier berganda menggunakan SPSS 21. Hasil uji 
simultan menunjukkan bahwa struktur kepemilikan saham mempengaruhi risiko 
pengambilalihan. Secara parsial, kepemilikan institusional dan kepemilikan publik memiliki 
efek negatif pada risiko pengambil-alihan dan kepemilikan individu memiliki efek positif pada 
risiko pengambilalihan. Risiko pengambilalihan yang dilakukan oleh pemegang saham 
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pengendali terhadap pemegang saham non-pengendali lebih kecil ketika kepemilikan saham 
oleh institusi dan publik dapat bertindak sebagai pihak yang memantau kinerja manajemen 
sebagai manajer perusahaan. 
 




1. Research Background  
Expropriation is an action carried out by the controlling shareholder (majority) against 
non-controlling shareholders (minorities). Sugeng (2005) proposed that this controlling 
shareholder is also referred to as the majority shareholder of the company's ownership. La Porta 
et al. (1999), Faccio et al. (2000), and Fosberg (2004) said that the higher the concentration of 
ownership on certain parties will bring out the majority shareholders who have more control 
rights over the company. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), Claessens et al. (2000), Chen & Mande (2003), and Sari 
(2010) stated the ownership structure can influence the behavior of the controlling company. 
The issue of expropriation is a problem that arises as a result of the parties involved in the 
company having different interests. This difference is due to the ownership structure of the 
company. The shareholding structure reflects the distribution of power and influence among 
shareholders for the company's operations. 
Research conducted by Cheung et al. (2006), Chen (2007), and Nielsen (2007) found 
that institutional ownership had a negative effect on the risk of expropriation. The research of 
Lemmon & Lins (2008) pinpointed that institutional ownership had no significant effect on the 
risk of expropriation. 
Research conducted by Sugeng (2005) concluded that public ownership had a negative 
effect on the risk of expropriation. The research conducted by Sari (2010) found that individual 
ownership had a positive effect on the risk of expropriation. 
Research related to ownership structure has been carried out in Indonesia such as 
Achmad (2008) and Hadiprajitno (2013) who stated that the structure of share ownership, 
leverage, internal factors, and external factors had a positive effect on firm value. However, 
research on the effect of ownership concentration structure that is associated with the risk of 
expropriation and the risk of agency theory type 2, has not been done much. 
Based on several studies on the risks of expropriation that have been carried out, there 
was no consistency in the results of these studies. Therefore, this research was conducted with 
the aim to determine the effect of ownership structure on the risk of expropriation in non-
financial companies listed on the IDX over the period of 2010-2014 
 
2. Research Method 
This study focused on non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
The study was designed to test the hypothesis which explains the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variables so that this type of research is a hypothesis testing. 
Research hypotheses were developed based on theories relating to research topics and then 
tested based on appropriate analytical techniques. This research was causal which aims to 
measure the strong relationship and influence between variables in the study. Before measuring 
strong relationships and influences between independent variables and dependent variables, 
each variable was defined and measured based on its proxy. 
The type of data used in this study was object data, while the data source used was 
secondary data obtained by researchers indirectly from the IDX which includes Indonesia 
Capital Market Directory (ICMD) and financial reports published by the IDX on the website 
www.idx.co.id. The data collection method used the documentation method, which is a method 
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based on secondary data, which was done by collecting company financial statements that have 
been published by the IDX. 
To determine the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the IDX 
over the period 2010-2014, multiple linear regression was used with the analysis model as 
follows: 
Expro(S,P,A,L) = α0 + β1 KIns + β2 KPub + β3 KKel + ε  
Description: 
Y : Expropriation (Expro-S,P,A,L) 
α : constant 
b1…b3  : direction of regression coefficient 
x1 : Institutional Ownership (KIns) 
x2 : Public Ownership (KPub) 
x3 : Individual / Family Ownership (KKel) 
e : Error 
 
3. Result and Discussion 
The estimation results of the study were conducted to test the hypothesis, institutional 
ownership has a negative effect on the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (H1), public ownership has a negative effect on the risk of 
expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (H2), 
individual ownership has a positive effect on the risk of expropriation in non-financial 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (H3). 
Based on the results of SPSS data processing (Appendix Table 1), it can be seen that the 
coefficient of determination shown by Adj. R
2
 of the regression equation produces a value of 
0.561. This value signifies that 56.1% of the independent variables consisting of institutional 
ownership, public ownership, and individual ownership are able to explain the expropriation 
risk variable. The remaining 43.9% is explained by other variables outside the model. This 
means that there are still other very influential factors on the risk of expropriation variable. In 
the simultaneous significance test shown by the F-statistic, the value generated by the 
regression equation was 26.603 with significance below α = 0.05. It can be explained that 
institutional ownership, public ownership, and individual ownership simultaneously influence 
the expropriation variable. The constant value of 1.891 shows that if there are no variables of 
institutional ownership, public ownership, and individual ownership, the risk of expropriation 
will decrease to 1.891. 
The institutional ownership variable regression coefficient of -0.018 states that if 
institutional ownership increases by 1%, the risk of expropriation will decrease by -0.018. At 
the level of significance, institutional ownership has a significance of 0.017 which is below α = 
0.05. The public ownership variable regression coefficient of -0.016 states that if public 
ownership increases by 1%, the risk of expropriation will decrease by -0.016. At the level of 
significance, institutional ownership has a significance of 0.020 which is below α = 0.05. While 
individual ownership variable regression coefficient of 0.036 states that if individual ownership 
increases by 1%, the risk of expropriation will increase by 0.036. At the level of significance, 
individual ownership has a significance of 0.000 which is below α = 0.05. 
This study found that ownership structure influences the risk of expropriation. This 
indicates that the risk of expropriation committed by controlling shareholders against non-
controlling shareholders is determined by the shareholding structure. 
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The first hypothesis in this study is that there is a negative influence between 
institutional ownership on the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. Hypothesis testing results indicate that the regression coefficient 
(beta) is equal to -0.018 which shows a negative direction with a tcount of -2.461 with a 
significance value of 0.017 smaller than the specified significance value (0.017 <0.05). 
Therefore, institutional ownership had a negative and significant influence on the risk of 
expropriation. So it can be concluded that the first hypothesis is accepted. 
In this variable, a negative sign in the regression coefficient indicates that if institutional 
ownership increases, the risk of expropriation will decrease. This result explains that the high 
proportion of institutional ownership can have an impact on reducing the risk of expropriation 
due to institutional monitoring. Strict monitoring of company activities can reduce the level of 
risk and can increase financing (capital) from investors, which triggers the achievement of 
increased corporate profits. 
Profit is needed by the company in order to maintain its survival. This profit will be 
earned if the company is able to market or sell goods produced or goods offered, meaning that 
the company has a competitive advantage. To achieve this goal, one effective way is by 
satisfying consumers and shareholders at a certain level of profit without forgetting their social 
responsibilities, according to the marketing concept. With this condition, the company will be 
able to provide useful financial statement information as a tool for decision making and will 
minimize the possibility of expropriation in the company. 
The results of this study are consistent with previous studies conducted by Chen (2007) 
who examined the relationship between institutional ownership and the performance of New 
Zealand non-financial companies. The results of his research showed that institutional 
ownership negatively affects the risk of expropriation. Chen et al. and Nielsen (2007) 
conducted a study of whether the ownership of financial institutions can reduce the risk of 
expropriation between shareholders and managers. The results of the study indicated that the 
majority share ownership by financial institutions can reduce the risk of expropriation because 
financial institutions can monitor management performance as a company manager. The results 
of this study are contrary to previous research. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conducted research 
on the ownership of financial institutions against the risk of expropriation of minority 
shareholders. The results of this research showed that institutional ownership had no significant 
effect on the risk of expropriation. 
The second hypothesis in this study is that there is a negative influence between public 
ownership on the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Hypothesis test results showed that the regression coefficient (beta) is equal to -
0.016 which indicates a negative direction with a tcount of -2.401 with a significance value of 
0.020 smaller than the specified significance value (0.020 <0.05). Therefore, institutional 
ownership had a negative and significant influence on the risk of expropriation. So, it can be 
concluded that the second hypothesis is accepted. 
The results of this study support the findings of Faccio et al. (2000) that examined the 
influence of public ownership on expropriation transactions of companies in Western Europe. 
The results of his research showed that public ownership had a negative effect on transactions 
that can lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders. Sugeng (2005) examined the role of 
the public in reducing the risk level of expropriation carried out by the majority shareholder. 
Sugeng's (2005) study showed that public ownership can reduce the risk level of 
expropriation because public ownership can act as monitoring. This condition illustrates that 
public ownership that arises due to the high sale of shares in the general public can increase 
monitoring manager's performance in managing the company during the research period. 
According to agency theory, public ownership has a negative effect on the risk of expropriation 
which is in line with this study and public ownership has a negative effect on the risk of 
expropriation. A high level of monitoring from the public investor increases the opportunity for 
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expropriation transactions. This happens because the proportion of public share ownership is 
spreading which is not concentrated in certain very high communities in Indonesia. 
The third hypothesis in this study is that there is a positive influence between individual 
ownership on the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Hypothesis test results indicated that the regression coefficient (beta) is equal to 
0.036 which indicates a negative direction with a tcount of 5.540 with a significance value of 
0.000 smaller than the specified significance value (0,000 <0.05). Therefore, institutional 
ownership had a positive and significant influence on the risk of expropriation. 
La Porta et al. (1999) examined individual shareholders against companies, especially 
in countries with poor shareholder protection. The results of his research showed that individual 
ownership had a positive effect on the risk of expropriation. Claessens et al. (2000) found the 
risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. The results of the research on individual shares 
showed that the structure of individual ownership had a positive effect on the risk of 
expropriation. Sari (2010) studied individual ownership that affects transactions with parties 
that have special relationships. The results of this research showed that individual ownership 
had a positive effect on transactions that allow the risk of expropriation. 
This is influenced by the existence of individual ownership which is concentrated in one 
particular individual that triggers the right of centralized control to the individual. This 
condition has a great chance of expropriation on other shareholders carried out by individual 
shareholders. The higher the percentage of individual ownership, the higher the chance of 
expropriation transactions. In individual ownership, individual shareholders who are the owners 
of the company have the right to control the company will make decisions to achieve the 
company's goals, i.e. profit increases during the period 
 
4. Conclusion 
This research was conducted with the aim to determine the effect of ownership structure 
on the risk of expropriation in non-financial companies listed on the IDX over the period of 
2010-2014. The results of this study concluded that institutional ownership had a negative 
influence on the risk of expropriation which indicates that hypothesis 1 is accepted. Public 
ownership had a negative influence on the risk of expropriation which indicates that hypothesis 
2 is accepted. Individual ownership had a positive effect on the risk of expropriation which 
indicates that hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
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